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Abstract
This paper describes how social capital emerges, relates to economic performance
and evolves in the long run. Using the concept of psychological equilibrium, two types
of individuals are generated in the population regarding their willingness to cooperate.
We propose an evolutionary (learning) process over those types driven by the total
payo¤s of the psychological game, and provide a complete description of its dynamics.
Macro-perceptions, dened as the individual perception of how cooperative the society
is as a whole, are key to explain convergence to the full social capital state in the long
run.
KEYWORDS: psychological game, belief-dependent behavior, evolutionary dy-
namic interaction, economic development.
JEL: C72, C73, D03, O1, O3, Z1
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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to explain how social capital evolves and its relationship with
economic performance and perceptions. Our main contributions are the following: Firstly,
we introduce the concept of macro-perceptions, roughly speaking, as the individual and
common perception of how likely cooperation is in a society. Then we use that concept
to impose an evolutionary dynamics over social capital. Second, we show that if there is
enough people favorable to social capital and macro-perceptions are optimistic enough, then
society tends to be only populated with people favorable to social capital in the long run,
and the best economic outcome is achieved. Finally we show that two societies with the
same technology, physical and human capital, but di¤erent macro-perceptions, may not
reach the same economic outcome due to social capital.
The term social capital refers in general to the degree of anonymous trust, willingness
to enforce contracts, to nance public goods or the social cohesion that exists in a society.
It is a relevant variable to assess the economic e¢ ciency and closely related to the ability
of institutions to establish e¤ective rules. Social capital mainly a¤ects economic activity by
reducing production costs in some cases (associated with litigation, security, surveillance,
bureaucracy and complexity of contracts, for example) or in others, by easing transactions
which would not take place otherwise. Intuitively, social capital may be seen as a catalyst for
achieving e¢ ciency improvements, or formally speaking, to reach Pareto optimal situations.
The proposed model studies social capital framed as the likelihood of cooperation in a
Prisoners Dilemma game by applying the concept of psychological equilibrium. Our main
contribution can be summarized in three elements. First, we show that mutual cooperation
can be achieved as an equilibrium if perceptions about cooperation are optimistic and agents
are reciprocal enough. Second, we consider two types of agents, the so called pro-social and
basic. Then, we introduce the concept of macro-perceptions, which for a given share of pro-
social agents in the population, provides the probability that, when matched, two pro-social
players will in fact cooperate. Third, by means of the replicator dynamics we endogenize
the distribution of types in the population. The result of it is that when pro-social type
agents are able to coordinate themselves on mutual cooperation through favorable macro-
perceptions, they are better o¤ than the basic type agents and in the asymptotically stable
state, are the unique type in the population. In addition, the model characterizes long-run
performances under di¤erent scenarios and carries out several comparative statics regarding
the e¤ects of education or institutional quality on economic performance.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the related literature. Section 3
shows the basic static model structure and preliminary results. The following section de-
scribes the dynamic model. Section 5 discusses the main results and their main implications
and section 6 concludes the paper. The appendix contains proofs of the results.
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2 Related literature
There is an extensive and recent literature on the relationship between social capital and
economic activity (see for an overview, [10] or [8]). Also, there is a large empirical literature
related to the measurement of social capital or the estimation of its relationship to economic
activity (see, among others, [21], [23] and [32]). In this section we discuss some of the papers
that closely relate to our model.
Our paper static framework relies heavily on the kindness function and the correspond-
ing psychological equilibrium found in [27], although we focus on the emergence of types
resulting from this setup with the aim of endogenize perceptions, issues that are not con-
sidered in [27]. Regarding the dynamic analysis, the closest studies to our model are [24]
and [25], where a similar concept to our macro-perceptions is introduced, although not en-
dogenously as we do. Also, we share with those models that social capital is measured
through the proportion of agents that cooperate in a one shot Prisoners Dilemma. With
a similar goal in mind the model found in [30] explains the distribution of interdependent
altruist and spiteful preferences in the population. However, our model does not consider
interdependent preferences, hence comparison of results is of little interest.
The existence of moral values is one of the arguments found in the literature of cooperat-
ive behavior. This precisely is the motivation found in [1]. This paper studies the evolution
of moral values jointly with pure economic incentives when two types of individuals interact
(homo kantiensis vs. homo oeconomicus).
Other approaches to study social capital are the following. In [22], [14] we nd the basis
of the institutional approach to social capital. The argument is that formal or informal in-
stitutions - conditioning behavioral rules - may determine collective behavior and individual
disposition toward social cooperation. A di¤erent theoretical framework is to explain social
capital by adopting the theory of networks. Some examples are found in [20], [26] and [2].
Finally, social capital may be understood as trustworthiness which is the case of our
model. This perspective relies on the role of individual beliefs concerning partners be-
havior, and it is generally formalized in a game theory environment, through preference
specications concerning a type parameter.
[5] highlights the natural fact of considering perceptions as a relevant subject when we
study social capital. This author also points out the need to explain perceptions as an
additional endogenous variable of the model. Some attempts are found in the literature
regarding the former, but not the latter. In particular, in [13] we can nd an example of
incorporating perceptions on countries - somehow as a measure of global reputation - to
explain international capital ows. The data indicate the existence of a positive correlation
between trustworthiness and investments ows into country. However, in that model, eco-
nomic variables do not a¤ect perceptions of trust inspired by a country, i.e., perceptions are
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taken as given in the model. Following the argument of [5], in our model perceptions are
endogenous.
Regarding the dynamic study of social capital there are mainly two alternatives, which
are the natural selection and cultural selection approaches. The rst one is based on an
evolutionary rule that operates on the population that cooperates - usually in an interactive
environment which, with appropriate interpretations, most of the time it resembles the
Prisoners Dilemma game. As a result, this evolutionary mechanism rewards the proportion
of the population that cooperates through reciprocity. An evolutionary model categorized
as institutional approach is found for instance in [19] (see references therein, mainly [14] and
[31]). A key point in this line of literature is the existence of a mechanism punishing those
who do not reciprocate. In our paper, we introduce a natural selection approach to study
the dynamics of social capital, although we do not introduce any punishment and obtain
converge to full social capital under general weak conditions.
In general, the natural selection approach can be summarized as follows. First, the static
strategic interaction framework is settled through a sort of Prisoners Dilemma. Second, a
tness function to establish whether a type grows or not, is dened - either in terms of
the true preferences or in contrast, using some related values. Finally, the analysis of
stability is carried out, usually assuming the replicator dynamics. There are at least two
interpretations of this methodology. First, standard in biology, in which individuals are
thought as automata following the precepts of a gene or pool of genes governing their
behavior. Second, it is considered that people learn - mainly by imitation- those behaviors
that are most successful from among the observable ones. (see among others [18] and [34]).
We choose the latter interpretation for our set-up.1
Cultural selection is the second dynamic approach to social capital, as described in [4].
Its main idea is to consider the cooperative attitude of individuals as a cultural trait whose
probability of being transmitted (from family or society) to descendants is subject to a
dynamic rule. The object of study is the dynamics of the probability of a given trait to be
present. In [9] this approach is applied to explain the relationship between social capital
and economic development.
[5] highlights that perceptions are relevant for a deep understanding of social capital
and its relationship with economic activity. This author also points out the need to explain
perceptions as an additional endogenous variable of the model. Some attempts are found
in the literature. In particular, the model found in [13] considers perceptions on countries
- somehow as a measure of their reputation - to explain international capital ows. The
1Possible Darwinian causes for cooperation has been observed in biology (see [7]), among which it is worth
to mention: 1) Genetic kinship, as por example, suicide bees. See [15], [16] and [17]); 2) Reciprocation, as
found in symbiosis (or in vampire bats, for example). See [33] and [3]; and 3) The benet of conspicuous
generosity, as a way to signal the true type, as the case of the Arabian babblers (see [12], [35], [36] and [37]).
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data indicate the existence of a positive correlation between trustworthiness and investments
ows to a country. However, in that model, economic variables do not a¤ect perceptions of
trust inspired by a country. That is, perceptions are taken as given in that paper whereas
in our model these are endogenous.
5
3 Theoretical Framework
In this section we introduce basic concepts and micro-foundations of the model in a static
setup. Also, we show preliminary results, which provide ground to extract useful implica-
tions for the full specication of the model.
We rst propose the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game to formalize how social capital
is created, economic e¢ ciency and its conict with individual incentives - as usual in the
related literature. The payo¤ matrix of the PD game is shown next in Table 1:
C D
C rX; rX 0; dX
D dX; 0 X;X
Table 1. PD game payo¤ matrix
where d > r > 1, C and D are for Cooperate and Defect actions respectively and X > 0
is the scale or size of the game. Introducing this variable will lead us to extract some
implications of interest. Similar specications of this game to study the subject of social
capital are easily found in the literature- see [6] and [27] for instance.
The utility function that we propose is a convex combination of two elements: a material
and a psychological payo¤ - a specication close to the utility functions found in [11] and
[27]. The psychological payo¤ captures agentspreference for reciprocity, what is formalized
through the interaction of individual kindness functions - to be introduced. In order to
dene these functions rst we need to dene some elements and sets.
We dene player is set of actions as Si = S = fC;Dg; we denote by ai 2 Si player is
action and by bj 2 Sj player is belief about player js action  rst order beliefs . That
is, bj is what player i believes about player j0s action. Also, denote by ci 2 Si player is
belief about player js beliefs about the action chosen by i  second order beliefs . That
is, ci is what player i thinks that player j thinks that he (i) is choosing.
Given the previous elements we dene vectors of actions and beliefs. In particular, let
a = (a1; a2) 2 SS be the vector of actions and 1 = (c1; b2) and 2 = (b1; c2), the vector of
beliefs of player 1 and player 2 respectively - where i 2 S  S for i = 1; 2: Next, we dene
the vector of micro-perceptions  as  = (1; 2) = ((c1; b2); (b1; c2)) 2 (S  S)2: Finally,
from the previous actions and micro-perceptions vectors we dene the Actions-Beliefs (AB)
array as e = (a; ) = (a1; a2; ((c1; b2); (b1; c2))) 2 (S  S)3:
From actions and beliefs we now dene the player 1s kindness to player 2 function. We
rst consider the set of all feasible payo¤s to player 2 for a given rst order belief b2 depending
on which action player 1 chooses, as 2(b2) = f2(a; b2) j a 2 S g: Let h2(b2) = max2(b2)
and min2 (b2) = min2(b2): Let the equitable payo¤ be 
e
2(b2) =
h2 (b2)+
min
2 (b2)
2
: This element
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provides a reference payo¤ level against which measuring how kind is player 1 to player
2 when choosing a1. Taking into account these elements, given b2, player 1s kindness to
player 2 function is given by
f1(a1; b2) =
2(a1; b2)  e2(b2)
h2(b2)  min2 (b2)
Following a similar procedure we construct the player 1s expected player 2s kindness to
player 1 function. First we consider a given player 1s second order belief about his own
action, c1: Thus, for a given c1 we consider the set of all feasible payo¤s to player 1 that
are associated to a particular player 2 expected action b: Formally, this is the set 1(c1) =
f1(c1; b) j b 2 S g; in which we identify the highest, lowest and equitable values, denoted
by h1(c1); 
min
1 (c1) and 
e
1(c1) respectively. Taking into account these values, player 1s
expected player 2 kindness to him is given by
~f2(c1; b2) =
1(c1; b2)  e1(c1)
h1(c1)  min1 (c1)
(1)
By operating in a similar manner we dene the player 2s kindness to player 1 function,
denoted by f2(b1; a2), and the player 2 expected player 1 kindness to player 2 function,
denoted by ~f1(b1; c2).
These kindness functions are used next to dene playersutility functions. We adopt
the general framework of the utility function proposed by [11], although we propose some
innovations as shown in the next denition. Agents interaction takes place when each
player chooses an action to maximize his utility, which involves taking into account both a
material and a psychological payo¤. This last element is formalized by each player kindness
to the other player when choosing ai, given the kindness he expected from the other player.
In short, the psychological payo¤ contains kindness functions interaction showing players
preference for reciprocity - that is, choosing to be friendly (hostile) when he expects a
friendly (hostile) action from the other player.
Denition 1 Players 1 and 2 utility functions are given by the following equations respect-
ively:
U1(a1; a2; ) = 1(a1; a2) + (1  )G(X)[ ~f2(c1; b2)][1 + f1(a1; b2)] (2)
and
U2(a1; a2; ) = 2(a1; a2) + (1  )G(X)[ ~f1(b1; c2)][1 + f2(b1; a2)] (3)
where  2 (0; 1) serves as a weighting parameter for the material payo¤, G(X) -the psycho-
logical size e¤ect, such that G(X)
X
 ~G(X) is a decreasing function and lim
X!1
~G(X) = 0: The
motivation for G(X) is to balance the role of X in both components of the utility function.
Although assumptions on G(X) are mainly technical, the way we introduce X in the utility
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function is consistent with related literature suggesting that the size of the game increases
the probability of choosing D in the PD or similar games - see [6] or [27].
Next we dene the equilibrium concept linked to the utility function just considered.
Denition 2 The Action-Beliefs vector (a1; a

2; 
); where  = ((c1; b

2); (b

1; c

2)) is a Psy-
chological Equilibrium (PE) if
i) U1(a

1; a

2; 
)  U1(a1; a2; ) for all a1 2 S
ii) U2(a

1; a

2; 
)  U2(a1; a2; ) for all a2 2 S
iii) a1 = b

1 = c

1 and a

2 = b

2 = c

2.
Conditions i) and ii) establish that the pair of actions (a1; a

2) is a Nash equilibrium
given the exogenous beliefs vector ; while condition iii) implies that beliefs should be
consistent with actions in the PE.
It is convenient to remark that since beliefs are exogenous within the denition of PE,
it might be tempting to think that the concept of PE barely contribute to explain the
relationship between beliefs, actions and economic performance. Nevertheless, this is a rst
step in the development of the model, and once it is fully specied, beliefs will become
endogenous. Hence, within the dynamic aggregate setup, we will be able to describe how
beliefs a¤ect actions and economic performance in the long run and vice versa.
3.1 Preliminary results
We are now in conditions to identify the PE actions-beliefs vectors in a psychological
PD game as well as to show related implications. Since condition iii) is to be hold by
a PE, only some AB vectors are to be considered. Let the following AB vectors e1 =
(C;C; ((C;C); (C;C)))); e2 = (D;D; ((D;D); (D;D))); e3 = (C;D; ((C;D); (C;D))) and
e4 = (D;C; ((D;C); (D;C))) be the set of feasible PE candidates, as only for them, ai =
bj = ci hold.
Before formally showing the existing PE, it might be convenient to show in an example
the total payo¤s matrix of the psychological game for a given micro-perceptions vector.
This exercise may illustrate the concept and identication of the existing PE. Taking micro-
perceptions as c  ((C;C); (C;C)), since bi = ci = C for all i = 1; 2; it is possible to
compute player 1 utility level for all possible action pairs (a1; a2) from player 1s utility
function. The resulting total payo¤s matrix of a psychological PD given  = c is shown in
Table 2. Only player 1s payo¤s are shown since the game is symmetric and we assume so
far that parameters are the same for both players.
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C D
C rX + (1  ) 3
4
G(X) (1  )3
4
G(X)
D dX + (1  ) 1
4
G(X) X + (1  ) 1
4
G(X)
Table 2. Psychological PD total payo¤s for  = c
A psychological equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the psychological game generated
by a given micro-perception vector. Hence, for our example, to identify a PE we just need to
prove that a pair of actions is a Nash equilibrium using Table 2 information. It is of course
of interest to nd out whether the pair of actions (C;C) could be a Nash equilibrium under
certain conditions. Since variations of material and psychological payo¤s have opposite sign
when player 1 deviates from C, the pair of actions (C;C) would be in fact a Nash equilibrium
depending on  and X:
We show next a full formalization of the existing PE generated by the psychological
game, for the set of all possible beliefs which are consistent with the AB vectors of interest.
For a clear understanding of the next result, we consider the possibility of di¤erent player
specic values for the parameter ; where i denotes player is parameter value, for i = 1; 2:
Proposition 1 Consider the utility functions given in Denition 1. Then:
a) Neither e3 nor e4 can be PE;
b) For any i 2 [0; 1] with i = 1; 2, e2 is a PE;
c) Taking
~(X) =
~G(X)
2(d  r) + ~G(X) (4)
then: i) If i  ~(X) with i = 1 or i = 2 , e2 is the unique PE; ii) If i < ~ with
i = 1; 2, e1 (and e2) is a PE.
d) ~(X) is decreasing in X and lim
X!1
~(X) = 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
Some interpretations and implications of interest come out from the proposition above.
Items (a), (b) and (c) imply that there are only two PE: e1 and e2. Thus, adding a psycholo-
gical term to the standard utility function allows to achieve the cooperative solution in a PD
game under certain conditions. On the other hand it is worth saying that by construction,
one or another PE is to be achieved depending on the micro-perception vector considered
by each player, as well as on the value of the parameter . In particular, e1 is achieved if
and only if 1 = 

2 = (C;C) and i < ~(X) for all i = 1; 2: If i > ~(X) for i = 1 or i = 2,
then e2 is the unique existing PE, and obviously it is achieved if 

1 = 

2 = (D;D).
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Although a relative low weight to the material payo¤ is needed in order to achieve the
cooperative PE, item (d) shows that such weight has to decrease if the size of the game, X;
increases. In other words, the higher the economic transaction in hand is, the lesser has to
be  to achieve the cooperative PE.
So far this static framework relies closely on the [27] model so the previous result can
be easily derived from it. However, it was needed to state it properly for the sake of the
forthcoming development of the model. In particular, we draw one important implication
from Proposition 1 which is the following. Given X; the critical value ~(X) leads us to
consider two types of agents within the population. On the one hand, those whose parameter
is C < ~(X); and on the other hand, those characterized by the parameter value D 
~(X): These are called the pro-social type and the basic type respectively.
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4 Aggregation and dynamic setup
In this section we describe the aggregated economy and its dynamic behavior. Aggregation
is modeled using a structure close to that of the overlapping generation models, in an innite
periods horizon where time is a discrete variable. Thus, in each period a new generation is
born, each individual living two periods. As previously mentioned, there exist two types of
individuals, called pro-social and basic types, denoted as C and D respectively.
We propose the replicator dynamics approach for the determination and evolution of
types.2 Roughly, this general mechanism operates as follows: during the rst period of life
each individual acquires his type (either in a biological sense or in a learning interpretation
of the process) for his second period of life. The acquired type by this evolutionary process
is the one that belongs to the group with a higher level of expected utility than the average
expected payo¤ of the population. Because of that, the group of individuals of this type
increases within the population at expenses of the other groups.
For simplicity, we will assume that only PE, that is, e1 or e2; are achieved through
strategic interaction and that there exist perfect information on types.3 Once the type is
acquired, players are randomly matched and interact in the framework of the psychological
game described in the previous section, where macro-perceptions will play a crucial role
to determine simultaneously micro-perceptions and actions. The process thus described
continues period by period through generations, until the proportion of individuals of each
type reaches a steady state under the conditions that we consider.
4.1 Dynamic Analysis
First, we introduce new notation in order to dene the tness function to carry out the
dynamic analysis - recall that only PE are achieved through the game. Let U(e1; C)
represent the utility level of a type C player, conditioned to beliefs i = (C;C); for i =
1; 2. Similarly, U(e2; C) is the utility of a player of the same type conditioned to beliefs
i = (D;D); for i = 1; 2. Finally, U(e2; D) denotes the utility level of a type D player.
Let (t) 2 [0; 1] be the proportion of type C players in the population at period t: Let
~U(C ; t) and ~U(D; t) be the expected utility for types C and D players respectively at
period t. Finally, the average utility of the game is U(t) = (t) ~U(C ; t)+ (1  (t)) ~U(D; t).
The process governing the evolution of  is the Replicator Dynamics, given by the fol-
2Although the proofs are done using the sign preserving dynamics, a more general form of dynamics.
3It would be relevant to consider also e3 and e4, either by allowing basic type players to cheat a pro-social
one or simply as a result of an error in micro-perceptions. Nevertheless, the model becomes more complex
and does not provide new insights on what we already have.
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lowing equation:
(t+ 1)  (t) = (t)
~U(C ; t)  U(t)
U(t)
(5)
The Replicator Dynamics generates the same steady states and stability as any other sign
preserving dynamics (see, for instance, [28]), which we dene as follows. A dynamic process
(t+1) = F ((t); ~U(C ; t); U(t))  where F is a continuous function in all its arguments - is
a sign preserving dynamic if sign[(t+ 1)  (t)] = sign[ ~U(C ; t)  U(t)].4 Since there are
only two types of individuals within the population, when (t) 6= 1, the previous condition
is equivalent to
sign[(t+ 1)  (t)] = sign[ ~U(C ; t)  ~U(D; t)] (6)
For simplicity we assume that (t+ 1) follows a sign preserving dynamics hereinafter.
The purpose of our dynamic analysis is to identify the steady states for  and study
their stability. A steady state is a sequence ((t))1t=0 such that (t + 1)   (t) = 0 for all
t  0. Considering equation (6) we only need to know the sign of ~U(C)  ~U(D) in order
to conduct the dynamic analysis. Thus, if ~U(C)  ~U(D) > 0 (< 0),  increases (decreases)
over time. Finally, if ~U(C)   ~U(D) = 0; then  remains constant - which is the steady
state condition.
Given the previous argument we need to study the condition ~U(C)   ~U(D) = 0 for
identifying the steady states values. The computation of ~U(D) is immediate, as type D
players only choose D; hence only the PE e2 will arise regardless of the type of his opponent.
Formally,
~U(D) = U(e2; D) + (1  )U(e2; D) = U(e2; D) (7)
The computation of ~U(C) is not so trivial, as type C players can achieve any of the
existing PE. A player of this type will meet a type D player with probability 1   - hence
the only achievable equilibrium is e2  and obtain a utility level U(e2; C): On the other
hand, a type C player would meet a player of his same type with probability . In this
case he faces a dilemma generated by the existence of two feasible beliefs vectors - which
conditioned his behavior and thus the achievement of e1 or e2. Thus, it then comes up as a
natural question which beliefs vector players are going to choose.
4It is easy to check that this equation implies that [(t+1) (t)] = 0 if and only if [ ~U(C ; t)  U(t)] = 0,
except when (t) = 0. If (t) = 0; we impose (t+ 1) = 0: That is, a type cannot emerge if it did not exist
previously.
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4.2 Macro-perceptions
Given the need to provide a satisfactory answer to the coordination problem found in a
type C players matching, we introduce the concept of macro-perceptions. The intuitive
argument behind this concept is quite simple and a standard one in the economic literature.
In short, we solve the mentioned problem by assuming that type C players share a common
perception about the probability of coordinating their actions. Next we provide a formal
denition of this concept.
Denition 3 Given a population in which the proportion of pro-social people is , we dene
macro-perceptions through the continuous function () : [0; 1]! [0; 1]; which measures the
conditional probability, for an entrant pro-social player, of achieving e1, given that he is
matched to another pro-social player. The function () satises the following assumptions:
(1) = 1 and () is increasing in :5
Some comments are in order. First, note by denition () measures the probability of
a new entrant pro-social player of achieving e1: That is, in a society where  is the proportion
of pro-social people, micro-perceptions leading to e1 occur with probability (). Second, it
would have been su¢ cient to just require continuity on () and nothing else. Nevertheless
we have imposed two more assumptions () increasing and (1) = 1 for simplicity.
From the denition of macro-perceptions we can now compute the expected utility of a
type C player, ~U(C); which is,
~U(C) =  [()U(e1; C) + (1  ())U(e2; C)] + (1  )U(e2; C)
By rearranging terms properly in the previous equation, we have,
~U(C) = U(e1; C) + (1  )U(e2; C) (8)
where  = (): Equation (8) is consistent with the denition of , since for a type C
player, micro-perceptions leading to C occur (and PE e1 is achieved) with probability ;
and also those leading to D occur (and PE e2 is achieved) with probability (1   ). Note
that 1    > 1   ; that is, for a type C player, the probability of achieving the PE e2
is larger than the probability of matching another D player since not only this type (D)
leads to such PE.
Taking into account equations (7) and (8), we are now in condition to compute the
di¤erence ~U(C)  ~U(D). Thus, by substituting the considered equations, we have
~U(C)  ~U(D) = U(e1; C) + (1  )U(e2; C)  U(e2; D) (9)
5There is no need to impose any condition on (0), except being a well dened number.
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The steady states for  are found by setting equation (9) equal to zero. In the next section
we conduct the full dynamic analysis. It is important to remind for further interpretations
the meaning of  in equation (8), as this value is related to the probability of convergence
to the full social capital situation.
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5 Results
In this section we present the main results of the model: identify the steady states and
discuss convergence to the optimal steady state under di¤erent set of assumptions. Overall,
our main achievement is that we explain endogenous and simultaneously social capital,
economic performance, micro and macro-perceptions.
Proposition 2 Consider the dynamics given in (6). Then:
a) If U(e1; C) > U(e2; D) then there exist only three steady states: 0 = 0; 

1 = 1 and
I 2 (0; 1), such that I = A

(I )
; where A = U(e2;D) U(e2;C)
U(e1;C) U(e2;C) : Also, 

0 = 0 and 

1 = 1 are
asymptotically stable and I is unstable.
b) If U(e1; C)  U(e2; D), then only two steady states exist: 0 = 0 and 1 = 1, and
for all (0) 6= 1, (t) converges to 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Item (a) shows the most favorable conditions for convergence to full social capital. The
interpretation of the assumption stated in (a) is simple. First, if U(e1; C) > U(e2; D) -
say the cooperative condition henceforth - does not hold, it would be di¢ cult to observe
convergence to 1 = 1, since each one of the terms in that inequality is associated to the
expected utility of the corresponding type.
We require () to be an increasing function on : See that in this case there exists
a unique root for equation () = A in (0; 1) - which is a less restrictive condition.
Nevertheless, we impose increasing () for simplicity. In any case, assuming that only
one root exist in (0; 1) is an extension of the focal point argument used in coordination
games (See [29]). Indeed, the cooperative equilibrium works as a focal point, thus the more
pro-social people there are in the society, the more attractive the cooperative equilibrium
is, and the more likely it is to coordinate in that equilibrium.
If the cooperative condition do not hold, convergence to full social capital fails, as shown
in (b). In intuitive terms, full social capital is not reached in the long run if the probability
of cooperation between pro-social players is too low or if the return of cooperation is not
high enough.
The following graph ((t + 1)   (t) vs. (t), generated by the Replicator Dynamics)
shows the dynamics of variable  for the cases (a-i) and (b) of Proposition 2. The case
(a-i) corresponds to the existence of an interior steady state I : If for the initial condition
(0) > I ; the economy converges to 

1 = 1 in the long run. In case (b), there is no interior
steady state, thus the economy converges to 0 = 0:
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Figure 1. Replicator Dynamics for the rate of pro-social players
To conclude, recall that  = () is the probability of occurrence C, so the item (a-i) of
Proposition 2 allows us to interpretA as the lower bound of the probability of achieving C so
that the economy converges to 1 = 1 in the long run. The intuition of the above argument
is that people turn out to be individually cooperative (i.e. () is high enough) when
they perceive themselves in such a way that as a result of their behavior, the proportion of
pro-social players increases. In other words, an individual will cooperate when by choosing
"cooperate" it is likely to achieve cooperation, or in other words, when he perceives that
himself belongs to a su¢ ciently large group. So, because of this perception of himself, and
thus that cooperation was achieved, the proportion of pro-social players increases and the
economy converges to 1 = 1: This argument leads us to interpret informally () as a
measure of the degree to which people perceive themselves as addable or member of a group
in which their contribution is e¤ective.
Before presenting some implications, it is worth to establish the precise conditions under
which the cooperative condition (CC) holds.
Proposition 3 Consider the two types of agents given by the previous proposition, char-
acterized by C and D. Then U(e1; C) > U(e2; D)  the CC is satised i¤ DC <
r+ ~G(X)

1
C
  3
4

1+
~G(X)
4
 n(X;C).6
6The inequality DC < n(X;C) only is possible if C 6= 0. If C = 0, the Cooperative Condition is not
satised.
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Proof. It follows from algebraic manipulations and hence omitted.
This conditions says that pro-social playing e1 are better o¤ than basic type people, if
and only if basic people are not too materialist  in relation to pro-social people , that is,
if and only if D < Cn(X;C).
We can easily prove that dn(X;C)
dX
> 0 for 4
r+3
< C < ~(X), and that n(X;C) is
always larger than one. Therefore, the CC and the requirements C < ~(X) < D are not
inconsistent if, for instance 1
n(X;C)
< ~(X), which holds if and only if ~G(X) is large enough.
Observe, furthermore, that if 1
n(X;C)
< C < ~(X), then D can be arbitrarily close to one,
without violating any condition. In particular, if C is su¢ ciently small but not too small,
the larger is X, the larger is n(X;C), and therefore the larger can be D, without violating
the CC.
5.1 Comparative statics
Previous results allow to discuss the e¤ects of exogenous changes in D, X or  on the
probability of convergence to steady state 1 = 1 (value that may be estimated by 1  
I). These implications could be useful to explain some empirical regularities concerning
corruption or institutional quality and its relationship to economic performance. The proofs
are given in the appendix.
First we highlight some previous conclusions drawn from Proposition 2 when the CC
holds. In this case, we show that there exist convergence to 1 = 1 if and only if the initial
condition (0) is such that (0)((0)) > A: Thus, if (0)((0)) < A, there would be
no convergence to 1 = 1 but to 

0 = 0 and because of that, the larger is A
 the lower
the probability of achieving convergence to 1 = 1: Finally, note that under the conditions
stated, there exist a positive relationship between I and A
: Thus, considering two interior
steady states I(1) and 

I(2) such that 

I(1)(

I(1)) = A
(1) and I(2)(

I(2)) = A
(2), if
A(2) > A(1), then I(2) > 

I(1) since () is increasing.
Corollary 1 (D increases) If D < Cn(X;C), C < ~(X), (1) > A and ()
is increasing, then there exist a negative relationship between D and the probability of
convergence to 1 = 1:
To highlight the idea of this corollary, it may be useful to assume that 1
n(X;C)
< C <
~(X), as in this case D can be arbitrarily close to one. Indeed, in this last case, the
graphical representation of the result in the space ((t+1)  (t) vs. (t)) would show that
the inner root I shifts to the right as D increases, up to some limiting value smaller than
one. Since the probability of convergence to the optimal solution is 1 I ; we conclude that
there is a negative relationship between such probability and this and D.
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In intuitive terms, this corollary may explain the paradox of individuals weighting to
high the material payo¤, and by doing so penalize individually and collectively the options
to achieve the best material results.
Corollary 2 (X increases) If CC hold, (1) > A, () is increasing and C is large
enough (C > 43+r), then, if X increases, as 

I decreases, the probability of convergence to
the steady state 1 = 1 increases.
We show in Section 3, that as X increases, the interaction leads eventually to the non-
cooperative equilibrium, which in dynamic terms means that there is convergence to the
steady state 0 = 0. However, it is possible to nd convergence to 

1 = 1 if parameter
C is not too small or r is large enough. The intuition is that provided r is large enough,
then, the negative e¤ect of large X not only disappear, but also become positive. That is,
if the reward for achieving cooperation is high enough, then it overtakes the negative e¤ect
of a large X, so that the larger is X, the larger the probability of convergence to full social
capital state.
Corollary 3 ( shifts) If CC hold, (1) > A and () increasing, then societies with a
higher level of optimism about anonymous cooperation, converge with higher probability to
the optimum steady state 1 = 1. Similarly, societies with lower optimism converge with
higher probability to the ine¢ cient steady state 0 = 0.
We can consider that the level of optimism about the anonymous cooperation could be
measured by macro-perceptions function, (). Thus, an increase in the level of optimism
would shift the function  upwards for a given , which imply that I decreases and therefore
that the probability of convergence to 1 = 1 increases.
Some variables that could a¤ect that level of optimism about anonymous cooperation
may in general be related to institutional quality, as corruption, democratic participation,
transparency in the nancial sector and the legal system guarantees, or mass media political
power, for instance. These variables may be formalized through Macro-perceptions in our
model. So, if there is a shock related to those variables, it would be understood as a shift in
the level of optimism about the anonymous cooperation, which in our model is formalized
through ; hence a¤ecting the probability of convergence to 1 = 1.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have proven that provided that the CC is satised two variables are crucial in
order to obtain full social capital in the long run, the macro-perceptions and the proportion
of pro-social people in the society. That is, if two societies only di¤er in macro-perceptions,
the will not reach the same distribution of types and economic outcome in the long run.
In fact, that with optimistic macro-perceptions will achieve better economic performance.
These results beg the natural question of how to change macro-perceptions.
This is a complex issue indeed although some considerations are in order. Formal and
informal education is one of the main sources of perception on trust. Specially informal
education is relevant as people tend to imitate or learn successful behavior, which in our
model is captured by the fact that the dynamic process is understood as a learning process.
People tend to imitate, then to learn, successful behavior, so it is important to observe which
in particular is the successful behavior. On the other hand, we cast doubt on how strongly
formal education may help to increase social capital. Moreover, we conjecture that the
e¤ect of formal education over social capital is much lower than the e¤ect of the imitation
process, an issue that is left for future research. Finally, it may be relevant for institutions
to establish e¤ective rules to control the inuence of lobbies on mass media and also on
political actors.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
First we prove (a). Consider e3 = (C;D; ((C;D); (C;D))) and the player 1. We will show
that a deviation from playing C is advantageous to player 1. Imagine player 2 choosesD, and
player 1 chooses C. Recalling that U1(a1; a2; ) = 1(a1; a2) + (1  )G(X)[ ~f2(c1; b2)][1 +
f1(a1; b2)], and noting that ~f2(c1; b2) = ~f2(C;D) < 0, f1(C;D) > 0 and f1(D;D) < 0 we have
that both terms of U1(a1; a2; ), the psychological term ((1 )G(X)[ ~f2(c1; b2)][1+f1(a1; b2)])
and the material term (1(a1; a2)), increase if it chooses D. Indeed, 1(C;D) < 1(D;D),
and (1   )G(X)[ ~f2(C;D)][1 + f1(C;D)] < (1   )G(X)[ ~f2(C;D)][1 + f1(D;D)] , due to
~f2(C;D) < 0, f1(C;D) > 0 and f1(D;D) < 0: An identical reasoning can be made for e4
and player 2. Therefore the item (a) is done.
The proof of (b) is analogous to (a) and hence omitted (both parts of the payo¤decrease
by playing C against D).
In order to prove (c) we consider player 1, rename for practical purposes U1(e1) as
U1(e1; ) (recall that e1 = (C;C; ((C;C); (C;C))))), dene U1(D;) = U1((D;C; (C;C;C;C)); ),
and nally dene the function h() as
h() = U1(D;)  U1(e1; ):
Thus, we have that e1 is not a PE if and only if h() > 0, and that e1 is a PE if and only
if h()  0 (if we assume that when h() = 0, the cooperative equilibrium holds ). Now
notice that h() is a linear function of  and thus it is enough to show that h(1) > 0 and
h(0) < 0 and take ~ such that h(~) = 0. We have that U1(D;C; (C;C;C;C); 1)) = d > r =
U1(e1; 1)) so that h(1) > 0; on the other hand, U1(D; 0)) = ~G(X)[ ~f2(C;C)] [1 + f1(D;C)]
and U1(e1; 0)) = ~G(X)[ ~f2(C;C)] [1 + f1(C;C)], thus h(0) = ~G(X)[ ~f2(C;C)][f1(D;C)  
f1(C;C)]. Now, we have that ~f2(C;C) =
1(C;C) e1(C)
h1 (C) min1 (C)
=
r  r+0
2
r 0 =
1
2
, f1(C;C) =
2(C;C) e2(C)
h2 (C) min2 (C)
=
r  r+0
2
r 0 =
1
2
and f1(D;C) =
2(D;C) e2(C)
h2 (C) min2 (C)
=
0  r+0
2
r 0 =  12 , thus h(0) =   ~G(X)12 < 0.
Thus,
~ =
~G(X)
2[d  r] + ~G(X) (10)
and hence, if 1 < ~, and beliefs are (C;C;C;C), then C is a best replay to C. The same
reasoning applies for the player 2, and thus the item (c) is done.
The proof of (d) is a direct consequence of ~G(X) being decreasing and lim
X!1
G(X) = 0,
since any function of the form f(x) = x
a+x
; with a > 0 is increasing.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, we prove (a). To see 0 = 0 and 

1 = 1 are steady states, notice that if t = 0,
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then t+1 = 0 by denition of the dynamics, and the same reasoning applies for 1  t = 0
(the other type).
For the rest of the items, as now we are looking for interior steady states, we notice that
0 <  < 1 is an interior steady state if and only if ~h() = 0, where ~h : [0; 1]! R given by
~h() = ~U(C ; )  ~U(D; ) (11)
where ~U(D; ) = U(e2; D)+(1 )U(e2; D) = U(e2; D) and ~U(C ; ) = ()U(e1; C)+
(1  ())U(e2; C). Thus, ~h() = ()U(e1; C) + [1  ()]U(e2; C)   U(e2; D).
Then, to see that there is only one non-trivial steady state, it is enough to show that ~h()
has only one root in the set (0; 1). Indeed, as ~h() is an increasing linear function in (),
we have that  satises ~h() = 0 if and only if () = A (with A < 1, since we must
have U(e1; C) > U(e2; D)), and as () = A has only one solution by hypothesis, then
~h() = 0 has only one solution, which is denoted by I and satises 

I =
A
(I )
. Finally, to see
that 0 = 0 and 

1 = 1 are asymptotically stable, due to that ~h() is continuos, it is enough
to show ~h(0) < 0, and ~h(1) > 0; and that is the case as ~h(0) = U(e2; C)   U(e2; D) < 0
and ~h(1) = U(e1; C)   U(e2; D) > 0. Indeed, we have that ~h() < 0 for all  < I , since
~h() is increasing, due to that () is increasing; thus if 0 < 

I (0, the initial condition of
the system), (t) is strictly decreasing and then tends to some ; now, again due to that ~h()
is increasing and continues, we must have  = 0; indeed, recalling that we dened in Section
4 the general dynamic rule as (t + 1) = F ((t); ~U(C ; t); U(t)), where F is continuous in
all its arguments, we must have  = F (; limt!1 ~U(C ; t); limt!1 U(t)), and thus  must
be a steady state, what is impossible if  > 0, due to that ~h() < 0 and ~h() is increasing.
Similarly, we have that ~h() > 0 for all for all  > I , and hence if 0 > 

I , we have that
(t) tends to one as t tends to innite. Consequently, I is unstable. The item (i) is then
proven.
Now we come to the item (b). Notice that if U(e1; C)  U(e2; D) < 0, then A  1,
and therefore ~h() < 0 for  < 1 (as () < 1, for  < 1) , and thus there are no interior
steady states, and for all 0 < 1, (t) tends to zero as t tends to innite. Also, if () = A

does not have roots in (0; 1), then ~h() < 0 for  < 1 (recall that ~h(0) < 0), and therefore
the same reasoning as before applies.
Proof of Corollary 1
Taking into account that A = (D C)
C

(1+ 14 ~G(X))
(r 1)+ 1 C
C
~G(X)

, it can be seen that A is a
linear function of D, with positive slope. Then, if D increases, A increases too, and as it
was shown in Section 5 were we presented the results, 1  I decreases.
Proof of Corollary 2
First, it can be easily checked that @A

@ ~G(X)
> 0$ C > 43+r :With this in mind, the proof
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of this corollary is similar to that of Corollary 1. Simply notice that that if C > 43+r , then
as X increases, ~G(X) and A decreases and thus 1  I increases.
Proof of Corollary 3
Let Q represent institutional quality for instance and consider that (;Q0) < (;Q1)
for all  6= 0: Thus, (;Q0) < (;Q1), and then I(1)(I(1); Q0) < I(1)(I(1); Q1) =
A: Since (;Q0) is increasing, we have that I(1) < 

I(0); what proves the rst part of
the corollary. The second part is totally analogous to the rst one, and hence omitted.
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